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Why do corporate actors engage in pro-social behavior? 
A Bourdieusian perspective on corporate social responsibility  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social practice this paper develops a novel approach 
to the study of CSR. According to this approach, pro-social activities are conceptualized as 
social practices that are employed by individual managers in their personal struggles for 
social power. Whether such practices are enacted or not depends on the (1) particular features 
of the social field in which the managers are embedded, (2) the individual managers’ socially 
shaped dispositions and (3) their respective stock of different forms of capital. By combing 
these three concepts the Bourdieusian approach provides a particularly fruitful theoretical lens 
on CSR phenomena, not least as this allows reconciling seemingly competing 
conceptualizations in the existing CSR literature such as economic vs. non-economic 
motivation as drivers of CSR activity, micro- vs. macro-level explanations and voluntaristic 
vs. deterministic views of managers’ behaviors.  
KEYWORDS  
 
corporate social responsibility, pro-social behavior, Bourdieu, power, economic calculus, 
instrumental approach, political approach, practice theory 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades the corporate world has witnessed a dramatically increasing 
concern for socially responsible behavior (Carroll, 2008; Vogel, 2005). Corporations are 
increasingly engaged in pro-social behavior such as volunteering, philanthropic engagements, 
and releasing budgets to green plants. While in some cases this might be understood as just 
another form of marketing or PR (Varadarajan and Menon, 1988), in other cases it is more 
difficult to identify any direct benefit of such activities for the respective companies. In the 
academic literature pro-social behavior of corporations is well documented and widely 
examined (Crane et al., 2008), yet the explanatory power of the existing theoretical 
approaches is still somewhat limited.  
Most researchers on CSR have an instrumental view on CSR – based either on 
economic theory (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), instrumental stakeholder theory (Freeman, 
1984) or resource-based theory/theory of competitive advantage (Porter and Kramer, 2002; 
Hart, 1995). They argue that companies decide on the extent of their CSR engagement, 
depending on the anticipated costs and returns, hence limiting their efforts to an “ideal” 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001: 117) or “optimal” (Godfrey, 2005: 790) level of CSR. This 
does not necessarily imply that this level is ideal from a social point of view. According to 
such an instrumental view managers engage in pro-social behavior only if it serves their 
companies’ long term business prospects (Orlitzky et al., 2011). Hence, if companies engage 
in pro-social behavior, private and social goals are aligned. For example, the fact that BP 
voluntarily began to reduce greenhouse gases in 1997 (Reinhardt, 2000) can be explained, 
from an instrumental perspective, by the positive outcomes on firm profit combined with 
environmental protection. BP must have recognized that reducing greenhouse gases not only 
protects the environment, but that an investment in the greening of their plants is a source of 
competitive advantage and thus stabilizes or even increases the (future) market value of the 
firm (Hart, 1995). While such instrumental views are quite intriguing due to their relatively 
simple logic of instrumentalism they only capture part of the observable phenomenon. Several 
studies have shown that companies engage in pro-social activities even without adequate 
economic incentives (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Matten and Crane, 2005). 
 In addition to these instrumental views, we find a host of theoretical approaches that 
explain pro-social behavior not as a result of their instrumental calculations but as a result of 
the corporations’ moral duty. The most prominent amongst them are the Political Approach 
(Scherer and Palazzo, 2007), Normative Stakeholder Theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) 
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and the Integrative Social Contract Theory (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999). Scherer and 
Palazzo (2007), for example, argue that as a result of the declining regulatory power of state 
governments in the globalized world companies, particularly MNCs, are increasingly granted 
a political role having to fill the regulatory vacuum. Accordingly, corporations are expected to 
serve social functions, such as provision of schooling or support of health care systems, 
irrespective of their economic calculus. While all of these approaches are able to capture also 
pro-social behavior that goes beyond the interest of the organization, they are limited in the 
extent to which they can explain why some corporations accept this moral duty while others 
do not. That is, the claim that companies should domesticate their economic self-interest and 
engage pro-socially does not automatically imply that they actually will do this in the desired 
manner (van Oosterhout, 2010). 
 There are two prominent approaches that explicitly address how pro-social values come 
to influence corporate behavior: The Managerial Utility Approach (e.g., Hemingway and 
Maclagan, 2004) explains pro-social behavior on the micro-level as a result of the individual 
managers’ pro-social preferences. If managers have particular pro-social values and beliefs 
they will act accordingly – within the room for maneuver that the inner-organizational context 
grants them. Thus, like the three approaches discussed before the Managerial Utility 
Approach captures also behaviors beyond economic considerations, yet the approach cannot 
explain why pro-social engagement by corporations have increased over the years. For this it 
would be necessary to explain how the managers’ preferences form and change over time. 
The other approach explains pro-social behavior on the macro-level with the institutional 
expectations of the wider organizational field (e.g., Campbell, 2007). According to this 
approach, CSR activities are explained as result of corporations’ attempt to conform to 
institutionalized social expectations. While the institutional approach is able to capture pro-
social behavior beyond economic self-interest and also changes to pro-social behavior as 
result of changes in institutionalized expectations, it is limited in its potential at explaining 
variations in pro-social behavior across different corporations within the same organizational 
field. 
 For researcher interested in understanding and explaining pro-social activities this 
existing set of approaches are somewhat dissatisfactory as they are limited in their capacity to 
explain the observable variety of and development of CSR engagements. Against this 
background, we will introduce a new approach to the CSR debate arguing that by applying 
Bourdieu’s practice theory we can generate additional insights into the different reasons for 
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corporate actors to engage in pro-social activities – particularly where these go beyond 
economic profits of the firm. Thus, the paper will explore the additional insights into reasons 
and developments in CSR activity that can be gained from a Bourdieusian perspective. 
According to our Bourdieusian approach, CSR activities have to be conceptualized as social 
practices that are employed by individual managers in their personal struggles for social 
power. Whether such practices are enacted or not depends on the (1) particular features of the 
social field in which the managers are embedded, (2) the individual managers’ socially shaped 
dispositions and (3) their respective stock of (economic, social, cultural and symbolic) capital. 
We will show that by combing these three concepts the Bourdieusian approach provides a 
particularly powerful theoretical lens on CSR phenomena – not least as this allows 
reconciling seemingly antagonistic explanations in the existing CSR literature such as 
economic vs. non-economic motivation as drivers of CSR activity, micro- vs. macro-level 
explanations, voluntaristic vs. deterministic views of managers’ behaviors.  
 The remainder of this article is structured into five sections. We begin by reviewing in 
more detail the existing theoretical approaches to CSR, revealing their assumptions and 
limitations. This provides the background for explaining – in the following sections – how 
Bourdieu’s practice theory can be applied to the study of CSR. For this purpose we will draw 
particularly on Bourdieu’s concepts of different forms of capital, of habitus, of the social field 
and its respective illusio. After that we will discuss the explanatory power of the Bourdieusian 
approach against the background of the existing approaches to CSR and will develop an 
agenda for future research based on the presented Bourdieusian approach. The conclusion 
gives a brief summary of our results and reflects the contributions to the literature.  
 
REVIEW OF THE PREVALENT APPROACHES TO CSR 
In the relevant literatures, there exist a wide variety of definitions of the term CSR (Garriga 
and Melé, 2004). For example, McWilliams and Siegel (2001, p. 117) defined CSR as 
“actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that 
which is required by law”, while others emphasized altruistic, or “other regarding” 
motivations, as key to understanding the concept of social responsibility (Roberts, 2003). For 
the purposes of this paper we define CSR broadly as a form of responsibility involving 
attempts by corporate actors to favor social and ethical values beyond legal requirements. 
This definition abstracts from the specific motivations of corporate actors and focuses instead 
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on the outcomes. That is, corporate funding of a theater belongs to the realm of CSR 
independently of whether corporate actors had strategic motives to do so or felt morally 
obliged to favor the social good. By “pro-social behavior” we refer to the activities that 
individuals carry out to put these endeavors into action. Understood in this way, pro-social 
behavior includes e.g., volunteering, philanthropic engagements, and releasing budgets to 
green plants. 
 A review of the CSR literature reveals a host of different theoretical approaches (see 
Table 1). Arguably most research in the field of CSR takes an instrumental view (Lockett et 
al., 2006; Windsor, 2006). That is, any expenditure resulting from an engagement in a socially 
desired goal is conceptualized not as a sacrifice of profits but as a corporate investment that 
helps maximizing (future) corporate cash flows. There are a host of different theoretical 
approaches that propagate such a view. One of them is the perspective of the economic theory 
of the firm, according to which pro-social behavior is interpreted as a tool for optimizing 
corporate profits (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Husted and De Jesus Salazar, 2006). 
This approach presupposes that managers analyze CSR activities without any “pre-conceived 
ideas or normative commitments [because] only by correctly analyzing supply and demand 
conditions can mangers hope to make CSR decisions that are strategically or economically 
sound” (Orlitzky et al., 2011: 10). Accordingly, any observed changes in corporate activities 
towards more pro-social engagements, will have to be explained as results of changes in the 
conditions under which corporations operate in their markets, rather than changes in managers’ 
attitudes towards ethically desired goals. For example, an increasing demand for fair trade 
products might eventually lead to a corresponding supply: At some point the expenditures 
incurred in designing, producing, and selling fair trade products will be outweighed by the 
extra income generated through offering the new products (Baron, 2009; McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001). 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
TALBLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
A second approach, which is somewhat related to this economic perspective, is derived from 
instrumental stakeholder theory. According to this approach corporations are expected to 
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satisfy their stakeholders’ demands, yet the consideration of stakeholder interests is seen as 
rooted in firm performance (Freeman, 1984; Frooman, 1999; Jones, 1995; Pajunen, 2006). 
That is, stakeholder theory defines and identifies stakeholders according to their relevance for 
economic success. Stakeholders provide important resources – satisfying their needs becomes 
a precondition for gaining sustainable business success (Hill and Jones, 1992). Consequently, 
corporations should satisfy the needs of those groups of stakeholders that may have a 
significant influence on the ability of corporations to survive and make profit. In turn, where 
companies do not have an economic incentive to engage in pro-social behavior, they will not 
respond to stakeholders’ demands (Berman et al., 1999).  
 The same logic applies to approaches, which argue on the basis of Porter’s model of 
competitive advantage or the resource-based view of the firm. Both conceptualize pro-social 
behavior as a source of competitive advantage. In terms of the former, Porter and Kramer 
(2006) showed that pro-social behavior would serve both business and society. Hence the 
antagonism between profits and ethics can be resolved as it is assumed that there is no trade-
off between profits and e.g., “philanthropic investments” (Porter and Kramer, 2002). Even 
governmental regulation is said to enhance the competitiveness of corporations, as regulations 
may trigger innovations (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). Similarly, the resource-based view 
argues that pro-social behavior can contribute to the development of rare, valuable and non-
substitutable resources providing the basis for competitive advantage (1995). In his natural-
resource-based view of the firm, Hart suggests that companies have to follow three 
interconnected strategies (pollution prevention, product stewardship, and sustainable 
development) to sustain a competitive advantage. Hillman and Keim (2001) showed 
empirically how better relations to certain stakeholder groups can help firms to develop 
strategic resources that constitute sources of competitive advantage. 
 All the above perspectives conceptualize engagements in CSR as a means to sustain or 
further economic wealth. Many empirical studies support an instrumental perspective by 
showing that pro-social behavior may favor business prospects in many respects (e.g., Borck 
and Coglianese, 2009; Christmann, 2000; Stites and Michael, 2011). However, the “virtuous 
circle” (Porter and Kramer, 2002) which assumes economic profit and the social good as 
mutually reinforcing, does not grasp the whole story. Not least, Margolis and Walsh’s meta-
analysis (2003) has undermined the belief in the empirical validity of the positive relationship 
between social responsibility and economic profit. Hence, explaining pro-social activities as a 
form of enlightened value maximization seems to be too simple (Schwab, 1996): There are 
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many examples in the literature where companies engaged in pro-social activities in the 
absence of any economic incentives (Matten and Crane, 2005); these empirical examples 
demonstrate the limitations of approaches that assume profit-maximizing as the sole concept 
to explain corporate actions. 
 There are other theoretical approaches to CSR that transcend purely economic 
explanations of corporate activities. They do not assume that all pro-social engagements must 
necessarily benefit the corporation itself. One of them is the Political Approach to CSR which 
emphasizes the political role of business firms due to their power to influence social life 
inside and outside the corporation (Davis, 1976). This approach goes beyond the instrumental 
view on corporations by “develop[ping] a new understanding of global politics where (…) 
corporations (…) play an active role in the democratic regulation and control of market 
transactions” (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; in a similar vein Bottomley, 2007; Deetz, 1991; 
Gond et al., 2009). Hence, corporations are understood not only as economic but also political 
actors that have the duty to engage in political processes in order to fill the regulatory vacuum 
of contemporary societies. This political role enlarges corporate activity significantly as 
corporations are not only said to serve markets but fulfill political functions such as 
supporting health care systems, fighting corruption, providing education or preserving peace 
(Logsdon and Wood, 2002; Pies et al., 2011). To cope with such tasks, corporations have to 
subdue their economic calculus and install a governance mode according to democratic 
principles (Gilbert et al., 2011; Steinmann and Scherer, 1998) which will grant them moral 
legitimacy.  
 Another approach that goes beyond economic interests is Normative Stakeholder 
Theory which claims that the purpose of business is value creation for its various stakeholders 
and that each stakeholder group merits consideration for its own sake (Freeman et al., 2004; 
Bowie, 2012). That is, stakeholder interests are of intrinsic value (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). Managers should not try to satisfy the interests of stakeholders groups because of the 
alleged profitability in the long term but because it is their fiduciary duty to do so. This duty 
becomes most obvious in moral and economic trade-offs, i.e. where the satisfaction of one 
group of stakeholders automatically implies the dissatisfaction of another stakeholder group. 
Freeman et al. (2010, p. 28) stated that: “If trade-offs have to be made, as often happens in the 
real world, than the executive must figure out how to make the trade-offs, and immediately 
begin improving the trade-offs for all sides.” To give more guidance in such situations, 
stakeholder theory has been combined with many ethical approaches like those of Rawls 
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(Phillips, 1997), deontologists (Bowie, 1999), critical theorists (Reed, 2002), and libertarian 
scholars (Freeman and Philips, 2002).  
 A further approach taking a similar line of argument is the Integrative Social Contract 
Theory (ISCT), which is called this way as it integrates two kinds of contracts that managers 
have to adhere to in order to fulfill their moral responsibility: macro- and micro-social 
contracts (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999). The former is a hypothetical contract among 
economic agents which defines the normative ground rules for creating the latter. The macro-
social contract demands an informed consent among the contracting parties. Micro-social 
contracts in turn reflect the social and cultural embedding of the parties contracting in local 
communities. However, Donaldson and Dunfee assume that the informed consent derived 
from the macro-social contract is not a satisfactory restriction of corporate contracting in real 
life (micro-social contracts) as it virtually allows every type of contracting. Hence they 
introduce the notion of “hypernorms” which reflect the convergence of “religious, political, 
and philosophical thought” (Donaldson and Dunfee, 2000, p. 441). These hypernorms provide 
additional restrictions on managers’ activities as they expect managers to “respect the dignity 
of each human person” (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994, p. 267).  
 Clearly, the ISCT, normative stakeholder theory and political approach have the 
potential to give guidance on moral issues in the business world. Indeed, there are many firms 
that use “social criteria as a basis for actions that are right, good, and just for society” and 
which engage in pro-social behavior “for the singular goal of helping others” (Sánchez, 2000, 
p. 364). However, as these three theories are primarily normative they cannot explain why 
some corporate actors accept their moral duty by engaging in pro-social activities while others 
do not (Campbell, 2007; Devinney, 2009).  
 The Managerial Utility Approach is better equipped to explain why managers behave 
in a pro-social manner. The approach rests on the basic insight that individual values affect 
not only the way managers perceive and interpret the world but also the choices they make 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Mitchell et al., 1997). Consequently, it conceptualizes pro-
social behavior as a manifestation of managers’ preferences (Swanson, 1995, 2008). 
Assuming that they are not entirely determined by the organizational structures and available 
resources, managers use their discretion to express their personal values in their managerial 
decisions. This is not limited to any specific levels of the hierarchy, but managers on all levels 
are potentially showing pro-social activities (Hemingway, 2005). Clearly, the greater the level 
of discretion, the more managers’ decision will display their personal values (Wood, 1991; 
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Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004). Several empirical studies support this view. For example, 
Agle, Mitchell and Sonnenfeld (1999) found a significant relationship between CEOs’ values 
and corporate social performance and Graafland and colleagues (2007) compiled evidence 
that the religious believe of corporate leaders is reflected in corporations business conduct. 
 The Managerial Utility Approach differs considerably from the other approaches in 
that it assumes differences in managerial preference structures. As such it is quite strong in 
explaining differences in managerial engagements in pro-social activities. At the same time, 
however, the approach has some significant limitations when it comes to explaining the 
reasons for the differences in managerial preference structures themselves; i.e. the preferences 
themselves are not explained. As a consequence, the approach is of limited value when it 
comes to explaining changes in pro-social behavior over time. Such changes can only be 
explained as changes in preference structures without being able to explain this any further. 
 The Institutionalist Approach is the counter approach to the Managerial Utility 
Approach. While the Managerial Utility Approach focuses on the micro-level of individual 
actors, the Institutional Approach direct our attention to the macro-level of the larger field 
structures including the market, local communities, and state regulation (e.g., Campbell, 2007; 
Marquis et al., 2007). Forms and understandings of pro-social behavior is explained with the 
embeddedness of organizations in different formal (e.g., laws) and informal (e.g., religious 
norms) institutions (Brammer et al., 2012): In order to preserve their legitimacy and, thus, to 
ensure their survival, organizations conform to institutionalized expectations regarding pro-
social behavior. Hence, corporations that operate in the same context are expected to be object 
to the same institutional pressures and to adopt the same pro-social practices. Variations of 
pro-social behavior are assumed to be across institutional fields (Doh and Guay, 2006; 
Maignan and Ralston, 2002). Kang and Moon (2012), for example, found that firms operating 
in capitalist societies engaged more in strategic forms of pro-social behavior than firms 
operating in other contexts and Galaskiewicz (1997) showed correlations between corporate 
donations and the extent to which corporations had connections to non-profit organizations in 
their local communities.  
 The institutional approach clearly highlights the importance of the institutional 
environment to explain pro-social behavior. Contrary to the Managerial Utility Approach, it 
stresses the importance of institutional pressures that force companies to adapt pro-social 
behaviors and contrary to the instrumental perspective it offers answers to why corporate 
actors engage in pro-social activities despite economic gains. But by focusing on institutional 
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pressures only, it tends to ignore the role of managerial discretion. Much of the current 
institutional analysis of pro-social behavior envisages managers’ choices as determined by 
their respective organizational fields (see e.g., Campbell, 2007). This leads institutionalists to 
conclude that pro-social behavior differs across contexts such as geographical regions or 
economic and legal systems. Yet, the institutional approach appears limited when it comes to 
explaining differences in pro-social behavior between organizations located in the same 
institutional field, i.e. organizations confronted with the same institutional pressures.  
 As this overview has shown, the literature already offers a large set of different 
theoretical approaches that can be used to explore the phenomenon of CSR. Yet, while these 
approaches help to shed light on different aspects of pro-social engagement, they all have 
some severe limitations in their explanatory power. The instrumental approaches (Economic 
Approach, Instrumental Stakeholder Approach, Resource-Based-View/Porter’s Competitive 
Advantage) cannot explain CSR activities in the absence of economic benefits; the three 
moral approaches (Political Approach, Normative Stakeholder Theory, ISCT) cannot explain 
why some corporations accept their moral duty while others do not; the Managerial Utility 
Approach can explain differences between corporation with recourse to managers’ preference 
structures but cannot explain how these preference structures form and thus how CSR 
engagements change over time; Institutional Approaches can explain changes over time in 
terms of changes of institutional fields but they cannot explain differences between the 
organizations in the same fields. Thus, each approach can explain only some part of the CSR 
phenomenon while leaving out other important aspect. Hence, if we want to develop a better 
understanding about the reasons why particular corporate actors engage in particular pro-
social activities and why pro-social activities change over time, we need to develop a more 
holistic approach that speaks to all the different aspects of the CSR phenomenon.  
 In the following we will show that Bourdieu’s theory of social practice offers such an 
approach. As we will explain, Bourdieu’s approach is particularly powerful as it provides a 
framework for integrating many aspects of the existing approaches to CSR such as combining 
macro-level aspects of the institutional field with micro-level aspect of managers’ cognitive 
structures, instrumental motivations with ethical considerations, deterministic influences of 
social structures with managerial agency.  
 
A BOURDIEUSIAN PERSPECTIVE ON PRO-SOCIAL PRACTICES 
14/49 
Bourdieu puts social practices, i.e., socially shaped activities (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990) 
performed by individual actors at the centre of his analysis. Members of the organization 
enact many different kinds of practices including pro-social practices such as giving donations, 
attending courses on green technologies or organizing charity dinners. These practices are 
enacted in various social and institutional arenas (so-called “social fields”) where people 
compete for different kinds of (economic, social, cultural and symbolic) assets (so-called 
“capital”). According to Bourdieu (1986), the individual’s motive to enact any particular 
practice is to increase his or her capital as this enables an individual actor to yield power. 
Hence, actors are expected to perform pro-social practices whenever they assume that this 
will increase their capital and thus improve their relative power position in the social field. In 
the following we will introduce this particular perspective on CSR by elaborating on 
Bourdieu’s concepts of capital, habitus, field, and illusio. 
Pro-social practices as transformation of individual capital 
According to Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990, 2005) all practices are directed towards the 
acquisition and transformation of an individual’s (monetary or non-monetary) capital. By 
enacting practices, actors invest their capital, which they have acquired through former 
practices, in order to acquire more of the same capital or to transform the capital into other 
forms of capital.  
 Bourdieu (1986) distinguishes between three general forms of capital: Economic 
capital refers to monetary income as well as other financial resources and assets. Actors like 
shareholders, for example, possess economic capital in the form of shares of the firm, whereas 
actors like managers or employees possess it in the form of budget control and salary. 
Cultural capital exists in two different forms. It includes experiences and habits acquired in 
the socialization process, which are manifested in an actor’s knowledge (incorporated cultural 
capital) and formal educational qualifications (institutionalized cultural capital). 
Institutionalized cultural capital in the form of a job title, such as “CEO” or “Chairman”, can 
be transmitted. What is transmissible here is the title itself – the institutionalized cultural 
capital – and not what constitutes the precondition for the specific appropriation, i.e., the 
possession of the means of “being CEO” or practicing it as this entails the incorporated 
cultural capital. Social capital is the sum of resources that can be mobilized through 
membership in or access to important networks. Of particular importance here are the so-
called “strong ties” to other individuals which promote trust and reciprocity and facilitate the 
transfer of private information and critical resources (Gulati et al., 2002). The social capital of 
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different actors may thus differ in regard to the strength and reach of their ties to other actors 
within and outside their organization. 
 Like all other practices, pro-social practices have to be understood as attempts to 
acquire or transform capital. For example, when Jennings (2006) described how the then-CEO 
of Tyco, Dennis Koslowski, sponsored a travelling museum show, this can be interpreted as a 
transformation of his economic capital (i.e., the budget of 4.5 million dollar at his disposal) 
into social and cultural capital: Through this sponsorship he probably developed relationships 
to impresarios and directors of theatres (social capital) and gained additionally specific 
knowledge such as knowledge about funding theatres and arts (cultural capital). In this sense, 
pro-social practices can be understood as attempts to transform individual economic capital 
into other forms of capital. Hence, pro-social behavior is not a sacrifice of economic capital 
for the social good, but merely a transformation of the amount and structure of the individual 
actor’s capital. Thus, we can conceive of voluntary sponsorship of museum shows and 
engagements in pro-social behavior in general as an “anti-economic economy” (Bourdieu, 
1993: 54): Economic resources are transformed into other forms of capital, which in turn can 
be invested to enact further practices. 
 In order to fully appreciate the functioning of capital and the conversions from one 
type to another Bourdieu brings in another aspect of capital. Namely, an important 
characteristic of all types of capital is that they are based on mutual cognition and recognition 
among actors (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986, 1996). This is how capital acquires a symbolic character 
and functions as symbolic capital. Symbolic capital cannot be regarded as another form of 
capital; economic, cultural and social capital is transformed into symbolic capital if it is 
accorded positive recognition, esteem or honor by other actors. Thus, to understand why 
members of the organization engage in pro-social practices, the recognition of other members, 
i.e. the symbolic functioning or transformation of their capital, has to be taken into account.  
 Two points have to be highlighted to understand the functioning of such a symbolic 
transformation. First of all, different actors might perceive an engagement in pro-social 
activities differently. Some actors might consider particular attempts at transforming capital 
as legitimate while others do not. To stick to our example above, the sponsorship of museum 
shows might be recognized by some members of the organization, say Tyco’s public relation 
managers, as a sound economic investment since the funding is believed to increase the brand 
reputation and, consequently, helps to sustain or even enhance the long-term value of the firm. 
Thus, the capital transformations of the members aligned with the sponsorship of the museum 
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show is valued as long as the engagement follows the logic of a “strategic philanthropy”, i.e. 
the objective of the funding serves shareholder wealth (Godfrey, 2005; Logsdon et al., 1990). 
Consequently, the symbolic capital gained by a member of the organization will depend on 
the economic impact of the funding. 
 However, other actors such as consumers of Tyco, might evaluate the practice of 
funding a museum show as a “narcissistic” (Roberts, 2001) investment. That is, the funding 
becomes recognized as a calculated investment to gain economic capital and, thus, fails to be 
recognized symbolically. The transformation of capital is not seen as legitimate and will not 
gain symbolic capital, as it is not interpreted as an authentic attempt to serve others but as an 
“investment”, i.e., as something that is given in expectation of return. This is meant when 
Bowie (1999: 135) writes: “If the manager claims to act out of duty (because it is right) and is 
discovered to have acted from self-interest (instrumentally), a high level of cynicism results”. 
Thus a blatantly calculated social engagement may result in a loss of symbolic capital.  
Second, individuals might enact practices that function as representatives of other practices. 
For example, actors might describe on their corporate websites and in their reports how they 
engage in pro-social practices. Thus, we have to distinguish the practice of publically 
documenting (i.e. representing) pro-social practices from the pro-social practices themselves. 
While we often assume a direct relation between the two types of practices, this might not be 
the case. The representation of the pro-social practices might be flawed in two respects: First, 
anticipating the perceptions and evaluations of other actors, the representations may mask the 
real motivation for engaging in pro-social behavior. The reports do not display the practices 
and engagements as they are, but function as “self-presentational devices” that are “self-
laudatory” (Hooghiemstra, 2000). Referring to the above example, anticipating the negative 
evaluation of consumers, the PR-Managers of Tyco might not communicate the possible 
underlying economic motivation of sponsoring a theatre but will present this investment as 
the Tyco-way of favoring the social good. In this way, representational practices may mask 
the real motivations of actors to engage in pro-social behavior.  
 Additionally, the representational practices might function as some kind of “simulacra” 
(Deleuze and Krauss, 1983). Whereas in the example above individuals enact practices and 
mask the underlying motivation, simulacra represent practices that do not exist. In that sense 
they are not representations of real practices, but they represent illusions. That is, managers 
report on how they enact their moral duties catering to the social good, but the reported 
practices are not enacted: The report functions as simulacrum that aims to deceive other actors. 
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Roberts (2003: 250) described such a behavior as a “sort of prosthesis, readily attached to the 
corporate body, that repairs its appearance but in no way changes its actual conduct”. Others 
described such practices as “green or blue washing” (Laufer, 2003). The reason why 
individuals use such practices is again the enhancement of their capital position. As long as 
the deceived actors evaluate the simulacra as representations of real practices, simulacra are 
transformed into symbolic capital that ultimately enhances the fraudsters’ amount of capital. 
 
Habitus as producer of pro-social practices 
According to Bourdieu (1977), the engagement of actors in particular pro-social practices not 
only depends on the specific possibility and legitimacy of capital transformation but also on 
the actors’ individual dispositions, i.e. their so-called habitus. The concept of habitus 
emphasizes that practices are engendered and regulated by incorporated, generalized, 
transposable understandings and ways of thinking rather than just by cultural roles, norms, or 
by conscious intentions, meanings or calculations (Swartz, 2002). Bourdieu defines habitus as 
“systems of durable, transposable dispositions, […] that is the principle of the 
generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively 
‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, 
objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an 
express mastery of operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively 
orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor” 
(Bourdieu, 1977: 72). 
The habitus of actors consists of their individual dispositions, which they have acquired in 
their socialization process. It provides them with a kind of generative grammar, i.e. with 
cognitive frames and preferences that direct their actions (Golsorkhi et al., 2009). Thus, in 
order to understand why members of an organization engage or do not engage in pro-social 
practices one must analyze the respective dispositions.  
 The aesthetic disposition to invest in fine arts, for example, is more likely to appear if 
an actor is equipped with a considerable amount of cultural capital. In other words, an actor’s 
habitus draws on the actor’s accumulated forms of capital to enact practices – like, for 
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example, investing in fine arts. Similarly, members of the organization are more likely to 
behave pro-socially if they have acquired the corresponding dispositions through past 
practices. Thus, the manner in which, if at all, pro-social behavior is taught at universities, for 
example, has an influence on an individual’s future practices via the dispositions of habitus. 
For example, Schaeffli, Rest, and Thoma (1985) in their meta-analysis of more than fifty 
studies found that moral reasoning increased through moral education, particularly with 
participants in their twenties and thirties. Given the fact that most students are in this age 
group, Trevino and Nelson (2010: 15-17) concluded that business ethics courses clearly have 
the ability to change the actors’ dispositions towards pro-social behavior. 
 Knowledge regarding forms of pro-social behavior constitutes a form of embodied 
cultural capital, shaping the actors’ dispositions, which ultimately affects their pro-social 
practices. Since such dispositions are tied to the individual actor, pro-social engagements of 
organizations depend on their particular members. In light of this, it is not surprising to 
observe that corporate funding areas often shift when the organizational members change 
(Roschwalb, 1990). An engagement in pro-social practices reflects the unique dispositions of 
members of the organization. Hence, these members’ dispositions – their cognitive frames 
and preferences – are a key driver for understanding whether and in which manner they 
engage in pro-social practices. In this vein, managers’ preferences are “significantly 
associated with the direction of foundation charitable activities for certain causes” (Werbel 
and Carter, 2002: 56).  
 Bourdieu’s concept of habitus moreover suggests that action tends to be less 
consciously reflective than commonly assumed. Bourdieu writes: “Agents never know 
completely what they are doing” (Bourdieu, 1990: 69) because their practices are largely 
reflective of their habitus. Hence, pro-social practices largely occur at a practical and tacit 
level. That does not mean, however, that engagements in pro-social practices are never 
conducted strategically; of course, members of the organization may for example consciously 
fund museum shows to achieve some instrumental end. But, as Bourdieu argues, actors are 
most of the time not aware of how their practices are driven by dispositions that have 
been ”formed through past experience” (Dewey, 1988: 33). In this sense, pro-social practices 
follow a practical – not a rational – logic as actors do not “generally adopt the theoretical 
attitude of seeing action as a choice among all other possibilities; they usually see one or a 
few possibilities” (Calhoun, 1999: 145). Pro-social practices are thus immanent and reveal 
themselves as a process of everyday practical coping. This practical coping also refers to the 
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broader context in which members of the organization are embedded (Chia and Holt, 2006; 
Garsten and Hasselström, 2003). Bourdieu refers to the broader context as the social field, 
which we will introduce in the next section. 
 
Pro-social practices as a struggle for power in organizational fields 
Whether individuals engage in pro-social practices depends not only on the actor’s habitus 
and composition of capital but also on the specific structures of the field, i.e. on the social 
context in which they are embedded. In other words, the conditions for pro-social practice 
“cannot be understood without addressing the context [i.e. the social field] within which it 
takes place” (Dillard and Yuthas, 2002: 52). For Bourdieu the social field is constituted by the 
network of relations among different actors (Bourdieu, 1996, 2005). More precisely, Bourdieu 
relates the concept of social fields to the concepts of capital and habitus to show that social 
fields are structures of power relations among actors and that social action has a perpetuating 
or transforming effect on these relations. In other words, social fields are political arenas 
(Brint and Karabel, 1991). Actors in social fields struggle for (different forms of) capital, as 
capital is not equally distributed. They engage in the ongoing struggle as bearers of different 
amounts and combinations of capital, some of which yield greater advantages within that 
particular field than do others. Accordingly, we can distinguish between dominant and 
dominated positions, depending on the amount and composition of capital. The overall pattern 
of dominating and dominated positions constitutes (the objective structure of) the social field 
(Bourdieu, 1977, 1990, 2005). 
 In our context, the relevant social field is the organizational field that reflects the 
current power relations among different actors in and around the focal organization. Thus, the 
organizational field does not just include actors of the focal organization – even though this 
part of the field is especially relevant to explain the practices of members of the 
organization – but all actors that play one role or another in the activity in question, as power 
relations usually extend the boundary of one organization (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). That 
is, the organizational field may include managers of other corporations, suppliers, customers, 
journalists, investors and members of the local and federal governments. 
 As members of the organization continuously struggle for capital through their 
practices, actors’ positions and consequently the structure of the organizational field are not 
stable. The boundaries of the organizational field thus reflect the actual power relations, 
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characterized by an ongoing power struggle over the field. This implies that within the 
organizational field positions are negotiated and also created by the pro-social maneuverings 
of employees, civil servants, investors, etc. These maneuverings or practices are directed 
towards the meaningful transformation of capital to increase one’s power in the organizational 
field. Capital therefore plays a key role – as a weapon, constraint or stake – in the 
development and range of possible actions available to agents (Malsch et al., 2011). The 
acquisition of capital underlies all social actions as the different forms of capital can be 
employed as weapons to defend the actual position and as stakes to achieve a better position. 
Possession of capital can be said to “allow [the] possessors to wield a power, or influence […] 
instead of being considered a negligible quantity” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98).  
 In this sense, members of the organization engage in pro-social practices if the related 
practices can either enhance or stabilize their position. Bergström and Diedrichs (2011) case 
study of a massive downsizing at a Swedish company for example shows how positions may 
be enhanced because of pro-social practices. Although more than 10.000 people were 
dismissed, most actors, including the Swedish government, seemed to agree that the company 
showed social responsibility in the dismissal process as the discharged workers were 
supported through various voluntary programs financed by the Swedish company. However, 
the three Human Resource Specialists who invented and enforced these voluntary programs 
were promoted to become spokespersons for the company’s social responsibility.  
 At the same time however, actors sometimes take significant risks concerning their 
power position in an organizational field if they enact pro-social practices. In Drumright’s 
documentation of an organizational transformation towards a greener buying process, an actor 
judged the risk she took in fighting for greener buying decisions in the following way: “What 
made it scary was the ‘what if’s’. What if I misjudge the intensity or the longevity of the issue 
(....). I didn’t think I could lose my job, but I was concerned I could lose my credibility. 
Obviously, the down-side was when this thing goes to the top; if they say, ‘No, we don’t 
agree’, it could be damaging to my career” (1994: 5).  
 Through pro-social practices actors might also be able to stabilize their dominant 
positions. Top managers, for example, may engage in pro-social practices, as this will provide 
the symbolic capital that is needed to stabilize their power. The CEO of BMW, for example, 
financed the Institute for Advanced Study at the Technical University of Munich and was in 
turn awarded with an honorary doctorate from the same university (TU-Munich, 2010; BMW-
Group, 2010). In this case, the CEO’s economic capital in the form of budget control and his 
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social capital, in the form of his personal relations to other dominant actors at this university, 
were transformed into an institutionalized form of cultural capital. An honorary doctorate is 
highly recognized in organizational fields and can thus be seen as a form of symbolic capital 
(Bourdieu, 1986). This symbolic capital ensures a distinct position and legitimizes the 
dominant position of a member of the organizational field.  
 Thus, the willingness of actors to engage in pro-social practices depends on whether 
they generate capital that can enhance or stabilize their position, whereas their ability to act 
pro-socially is determined by the capital that they hold or to which they have access 
(Lawrence, 1999). Symbolic capital – and the means by which it is created – plays a central 
role in power relations among actors’ positions, as this “provides the means for a non-
economic form of domination and hierarchy” (Gaventa, 2003: 6; Adam, 2002, provides 
insightful examples from the nineteenth-century New-York). 
 In order to explain why particular (pro-social or other) practices are regarded as 
legitimate or not and how dominant actors might influence this perception, it is necessary to 
introduce the concept of illusio as a particularly important aspect of the social field. In 
Bourdieu’s practice theory, the concept of illusio stands for the field members’ unconsciously 
shared evaluations of the different forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1997). That is, by determining 
what value the field members attribute to different forms of capital, the illusio shapes the 
respective power struggles in the field (Bourdieu, 1984, 1988, 1990). At the same time, 
through their struggles for capital actors acknowledge and reinforce the importance of specific 
forms of capitals, which in turn reproduces the illusio. The field-specific transformation of 
resources is thus related to the actors’ assumptions of what is of value in the respective field 
(Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011). Hence, the illusio can also be described as a field-specific 
ideology which determines the field-members perceptions of the legitimacy of particular pro-
social practices (Abercrombie and Turner, 1978). 
 The illusio functions as ideology, as “legitimate violence” (Bourdieu, 1993: 73), in the 
sense that it regulates the relationships between agents in a field in such a way that it favors 
those who have already the best-established positions. It serves the interests of the dominant 
actors, which includes the CEOs and large shareholders in most corporations, as they have the 
capacity to determine which composition of capital will be the most influential and dominant 
in the field. Moreover, the illusio also limits the possibilities of resistance. The illusio, thus, 
functions “like the imperial system – a wonderful instrument of ideology, much bigger and 
more powerful than television or propaganda” (Bourdieu and Eagleton, 1992: 114). Dominant 
22/49 
actors, albeit largely unconsciously, define activities as legitimate and formulate the policies 
of the organizational field; in other words, they shape the rules according to which the 
struggle for power is played. Based on the illusio, they can largely control whether and, if so, 
what kind of pro-social practices are able to produce valuable capital that can enhance actors’ 
positions. Consequently, dominated field members conform to dominant actors’ pro-social 
understanding in order to enhance their positions – in the sense of the illusio. Even though 
some members of the organizational field may privately disagree with the (positive or 
negative) evaluation of particular pro-social practices, they will nevertheless conform to the 
field-specific illusio as they strive to enhance their power in the field. 
 A good example of how dominant actors determine the illusio and thus the legitimacy 
of pro-social practices is the study of PackCo by Baker und Roberts (2012). They describe 
how the chairman of that company, for various reasons, was keen on engaging in 
environmental programs, which he considered exemplary of PackCo’s “noble purpose”. 
However, when a survey revealed that the employees were not satisfied with the way the 
company dealt with its social responsibility, top managers did not change their thinking about 
the “noble purpose”. Instead, they reinterpreted the poll’s results as a lack of employees’ 
understanding of PackCo’s responsibility and tried by various means to “educate” the 
employees concerning employees’ responsibility for the environment. Baker and Roberts 
(2012: 13) concluded: ”Responsibility was in this way turned into an obligation of staff; 
management’s role was only to ensure that staff understood the company’s self defined 
ideals”. 
 
Changes in the legitimacy of pro-social behavior as result of field changes 
The legitimacy of pro-social practices within a particular social field might change over time. 
Illegitimate practices might become legitimate and vice-versa. Zadek (2004), for example, 
described how Nike’s attitude to pro-social practices changed dramatically in the course of a 
few years. Such changes have to be conceptualized as the result of changes in the field-
specific illusio. According to Bourdieu we can distinguish two central mechanisms of change. 
Both of these mechanisms rest on the interplay between habitus and field.  
 The first mechanism results from changes in the dispositions of the dominant actors. 
As we have argued before, actors will only engage in pro-social practices if the dominant 
actors have deemed these practices legitimate i.e., if these practices conform to the illusio. 
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Whether or not dominant actors deem such practices legitimate ultimately depends on their 
individual dispositions, i.e., their habitus. However, the dominant actors’ habitus might 
change (Bourdieu, 1984; Navarro, 2006) and, as a consequence, their evaluation of pro-social 
behavior might change. For instance, in our example above of the then-CEO of Tyco, the 
particular attitude of Dennis Koslowski towards pro-social practices might have been shaped 
through his board membership at the Whitney Museum (Jennings, 2006). Thus, his habitus 
might have been modified through the acquisition of new dispositions gained through his 
participation in another social field – in this case the wider social field of fine arts. As the 
evaluation of pro-social practices depends on the preferences and interest of the dominant 
actors, Dennis Koslowski, as dominant actor, could determine that philanthropy (i.e., giving 
donations to institutions like theatres, museums, schools and the like) came to be considered a 
legitimate practice in the organizational field of Tyco. Dominant members are thus able to 
change the understanding of pro-social behavior by controlling the illusio of the respective 
organizational field: They determine whether particular pro-social practices are deemed 
productive and legitimate in a specific field.  
 The second mechanism of change does not rest on the reproduction of the established 
power structures, but on revolutions of the established power structures induced by 
“newcomers” (Golsorkhi et al., 2009). That is, the system of authority within the field can 
change, including the very rules according to which the field operates (Bourdieu, 1984; 
Madsen, 2004). A change of the power structures typically results from a mismatch between 
the dominant actors’ habitus and the specific structures of the organizational field. As 
Bourdieu writes, this mismatch  
“[…] can be clearly seen in all the situations in which [habitus is] not the product of the 
conditions of its actualization […]: this is the case […] when old people quixotically 
cling to dispositions that are out of place and out of time; or when the dispositions of an 
agent rising, or falling, in the social structure […] are at odds with the position that 
agent occupies” (Bourdieu, 2005: 214).  
Thus, when the habitus of the dominant actors are no longer in line with the field structures, 
an opportunity is created for other actors to challenge the existing positions of power. For 
example, other members of the executive team might gradually edge out a CEO of his or her 
formerly dominant position, as his or her habitus becomes unaligned to the structures of the 
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field. To the extent that these executives have been socialized differently – for example as a 
result of their business education – they might also introduce new views on pro-social 
behavior. That is, since the CEO’s habitus does not match the new structure of the 
organizational field, the executives are enabled to take positions that are no longer accessible 
for the CEO (Bourdieu, 1996). As habitus triggers the transformation of the field-specific 
rules whenever it encounters a social setting discrepant with the setting from which it issues 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), the habitus of the new executives might trigger the value of 
pro-social practices within the organizational field. The executives’ influence on the illusio 
also shapes a new understanding of the capital that are of value and consequently the power 
structure in the organizational field. In this sense, new actors entering an organizational field 
might (re-)shape the field-specific struggles and change the current understanding of pro-
social behavior. Through their habitus, the newcomers might impose their composition of 
capital as the legitimate form in the organizational field, which has the effect of shifting the 
power structure of the organizational field by excluding the holder of the defeated forms of 
capital. In this case a new domination structure emerges with other rules, stakes and forms of 
capital including the illusio of that particular field and thus actors’ beliefs and values 
regarding pro-social behavior. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The Bourdieusian approach to CSR developed in this paper provides a new way of exploring 
how and why organizational actors engage in pro-social behavior. In this section we will 
discuss the implications of this approach for our research on CSR and how this can add to our 
existing debates on this topic. We will do this in three steps. We will first compare the 
Bourdieusian approach to the prevalent approaches to CSR showing how it allows addressing 
aspects of pro-social behavior that the other approaches have left out. We then offer some 
guidance on how the Bourdieusian approach might be applied in empirical research on CSR. 
After that we will sketch future directions for further development of the Bourdieusian 
approach to CSR. 
 
Comparison of the Bourdieusian Approach with the prevalent approaches to CSR 
In this comparison of the Bourdieusian approach to the prevalent approaches in the literature 
we will focus on four aspects that seem particular interesting with regard to CSR research: 
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level of analysis, logic of action, the role of the economic calculus and finally the key driver 
to engage in CSR (see also Table 1). 
 Our first point of comparison concerns the level of analysis. One of the main advantages 
of the Bourdieusian approach to CSR is its ability to combine macro and micro level 
explanations: pro-social activities are explained as a result of a combination of the micro-level 
dispositions of individual actors and the macro structures of the field, which includes the 
distribution of capital and the field-specific illusio. In contrast to that, all existing approaches 
focus either on the macro or micro level. Whereas Porter (2002) and Hart (1995) do not 
address the individual level at all, the economic approach as well as the instrumental and 
normative stakeholder theory treat managers and organizations as the same entities; the terms 
“manager” and “corporation” become interchangeable (Orlitzky et al., 2011). Hence, they 
presume homologous corporate action, which consequently leads to a conceptualization of 
CSR as a corporate activity. This focus on only one level of analysis applies to other 
approaches as well. Both the Integrative Social Contract Theory and the Managerial Utility 
Approach address the individual level only. The former explains pro-social behavior with 
managers’ duty to adhere to hypernorms, the later refers to mangers’ individual preference 
structures.  
 The only theories that systematically address more than one level of analysis are the 
Political and the Institutional Approach to CSR. The former focuses on the corporation’s role 
in society. Corporations are expected to become democratized and involved in political 
processes in order to fulfill their political function in a globalized world. Yet, by 
concentrating on the organizational and societal levels of analysis, they tend to neglect the 
level of the individual actors. Similarly, the Institutionalist Approach focuses the attention on 
the interplay between organization and institutional field. They draw a complex picture of 
how organizations are influenced by the wider institutional structures in which they are 
embedded. But they overemphasize the macro-perspective, reducing the influence of 
individual agency to a minimum. In that sense, “institutionalists (…) portray organizations as 
passive pawns, adapting willingly to institutionalized expectations in organizational fields 
(…)” (Tempel and Walgenbach, 2007: 10). The Institutional Approach grants managers 
virtually no room for maneuver. In contrast to that, the Bourdieusian Approach allows 
addressing both the micro- and the macro level. This provides the opportunity to account for 
the structures of markets, politics, and social identities without having to ignore the influence 
of individuals. In this way it allows integrating some of the insights of the existing approaches 
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that have focused on individual aspects only. In addition to that, the Bourdieusian approach 
shifts the attention to the interplay of the micro- and macro-level forces; that is, it does not 
only acknowledge that both levels have to be taken into account but it also explains how the 
different levels influence and enforce each other. 
Our second point of comparison concerns the assumed logic of action. In the 
Bourdieusian approach action is conceptualized as based on a “practical logic” (Bourdieu, 
1990), i.e. all action is based on pre-existing practices which provide guidance to them. This 
distinguishes the approach clearly from the prevalent approaches to CSR. The Economic 
Approach assumes economically rational managers i.e., managers that anticipate the outcome 
of alternative courses of action, calculate their respective outcomes, and choose voluntarily 
between these alternatives. The Political Approach assumes voluntaristic action as well, 
though it differs in its understanding of rationality, which it defines discursively. Managers in 
both Stakeholder Approaches are assumed to resolve the potential trade-off between 
stakeholder interests by critically reflecting the entitlements and potential influences of each 
group, and finally, the Integrative Social Contract Theory addresses managers’ duty to 
contract according to moral duties. However, all these approaches argue against the 
background of a subjectivistic philosophy assuming that pro-social actions are voluntarily 
chosen. In other words, managers are able to critically reflect on and voluntary decide to 
engage in pro-social behavior without any constraint by “objective structures” (Bourdieu, 
1990) that would guide their perceptions and evaluations.  
 The remaining two approaches exhibit the opposite assumption about the logic of action. 
The latter approach does not explicitly clarify the extent to which personal values are 
accessible to critical reflection. Yet, as it is assumed that individual values stem from cultural 
and religious settings (Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004), one could argue that the Managerial 
Utility Approach assumes a deterministic logic of action. The Institutionalist Approach 
conceives of pro-social actions as purely reactive responses by corporations to institutional 
pressures leaving little room for individual agency. Hence pro-social practices do not reflect 
the voluntary actions of managers but are induced by the social structures. Choices on CSR 
are highly institutionalised, and thus “beyond the discretion of any individual participant or 
organization” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 344). The Bourdieusian Approach is somewhat 
similar to the institutional perspective as it also assumes that pro-social behavior is to a large 
extent unreflective. Practices are ‘naturally’ and immediately adjusted to their respective 
fields through habitus (Bourdieu, 1990). Yet, individual actions are not fully determined by 
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the social structures, but actors have the possibility to consciously reflect on them. That is, 
although the capital position in their respective field together with their habitus defines the 
range of possible actions of each individual, the habitus constitutes a generative grammar 
which allows multiple actions to consciously choose from. In this way, the Bourdieusian 
approach goes beyond the somewhat one-sided treatments of action in the existing approaches 
to CSR by combining deterministic and voluntaristic aspects in the enactment of pro-social 
behavior: Actors do have the ability to consciously reflect and change pro-social practices but 
are at the same restricted through their habitus and their capital position in the respective field. 
  The third point of comparison concerns the role of economic calculus. Obviously the 
Bourdieusian approach contradicts those perspectives that plead for a domistification of the 
economic calculus (i.e., Political Approaches, Normative Stakeholder Theory, and Integrative 
Social Contract Theory). According to Bourdieu, an engagement in pro-social practices 
ultimately depends on whether it is beneficial in the struggle for power. This seems to be 
similar to instrumental perspectives on CSR. Clearly, Bourdieu sees cultural and social capital 
as ‘disguised forms of economic capital’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 54), i.e., cultural and social capital 
can only be acquired through the investment of economic capital and, thus, are derived from 
economic capital. Yet, the Bourdieusian concept of capital clearly extends simple 
instrumental understandings of the role of capital by highlighting the inextricably social and 
political nature of the process of capital acquisition and conversion (Everett, 2002) as well as 
the key role of symbolic mediation in this process. Consequently, a Bourdieusian perspective 
conceives the value of social and cultural capital as independent of their economic impact. 
Yet, the economic calculus remains the ultimate source of motivation as a Bourdieusian 
perspective expands the role of the economic calculus assuming that all practices are directed 
towards the transformation and acquisition of capital. But at the same time the role of the 
economic calculus in explaining pro-social behavior is contingent as the enactment of pro-
social practices ultimately depends on the field specific ideology. In that sense, it shows 
similarities to the Managerial Utility Approach and the Institutional Perspective which both 
assume that the role of the economic calculus is contingent either on the preference structure 
of the individual or the institutional structure. The difference to these approaches lies in the 
way the contingency is conceptualized: The Managerial Utility Approach and the 
Intuitionalist perspective allow for a suspension of the economic calculus depending on the 
respective institutional structures or individual preferences. A Bourdieusian perspective 
allows for a suspension of the economic calculus in terms of the expected economic return, as 
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actors strive for other forms of capital. Yet it does not allow for a suspension of the economic 
calculus as an implicit and underlying aspect behind all forms of capital aquisition. 
 The fourth and final point of comparison concerns the assumed drivers for an 
engagement in CSR. The Bourdieusian logic of the “anti-economic economy” sheds new light 
on the question why corporate actors engage in pro-social behavior. According to Bourdieu 
these engagements are not driven by their economic impact on shareholder value as 
instrumental approaches suggest (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), nor by reactions to 
institutional pressures in order to survive as the Institutionalist Approach assumes (Campbell, 
2007). And contrary to the remaining approaches discussed above pro-social behavior is not 
conceptualized as motivated by an “intrinsic rationale” (Basu and Palazzo, 2008) of managers 
or corporations. If managers invest their capital to engage in CSR initiatives such as 
participating in the Global Compact, voluntarily disclosing information about supply chains, 
and engaging in political process lobbying for mandatory regulations on global standards for 
social auditing (Zadek, 2004), we have to interpret this as attempts to gain capital that help the 
respective actors to sustain or enhance their position in their organizational field. Yet, within 
this struggle for power the Bourdieusian approach allows for a wide range of different 
motivations for individual actors which includes authentic concerns for the social good (as 
assumed by normative approaches), concerns for legitimacy (as suggested by the institutional 
approach) as well as the instrumental concerns for economic profit (as suggested by the 
different instrumental approaches). 
As this comparison of different theoretical approaches has shown, the Bourdieusian 
approach can be seen as a fruitful addition to the existing set of approaches to CSR. Its 
strength lies particularly in its ability to provide a more integrative view of CSR, which can 
even reconcile some of the conflicting positions in the existing theories. Through the 
considerations of micro and macro influences, economic and non-economic motives, 
voluntaristic and deterministic aspects of human action, it shifts attention to the “daily 
experiences and moral problems of real people in their everyday life” (Tronto, 1993: 79). 
 
Implications for empirical research on CSR 
The Bourdieusian approach has important implications for empirical research on CSR. It 
highlights the importance of understanding the field-specific values of the different forms of 
capital and their rates of conversion, the identification of the dominant actors and their 
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specific dispositions. In order to understand why and under what conditions particular 
corporate actors display pro-social behaviors one needs to examine the way in which the 
dominant actors influence the perceptions of the legitimacy of particular pro-social practices 
and how this relates to the existing distribution of capital. Accordingly, empirical research on 
the motivation for pro-social behavior would be structured around the following three steps: 
(1) Identification of the value of capital and its rates of conversion. In order to understand the 
motivation of actors for particular pro-social behaviors, the first step includes an investigation 
of the value of the different forms of capital and the rates of conversion between them. One 
way to explore this issue is to observe the current enactment of pro-social practices (c.f., 
Oakes et al., 1998). These observations can then be analyzed with regard to the particular 
requirements and consequences – in terms of economic, social and cultural capital – which 
the enactment of these practices entails. This also allows the researcher to identify the kind of 
capital transformation that takes place in the enactment of the pro-social practices. Based on 
this analysis the researcher will see patterns a of capital transformations documenting the 
motivations for pro-social practices.  
(2) Identification of the dominant actors. The investigation of the values and rates of capital 
provide a basis for identifying, in a second step, those actors that hold dominant positions, as 
these determine whether and what kind of pro-social behavior is of value. The dominant 
actors can thereby be identified on the basis of an analysis of the relative distribution of 
capital between the different members of the field. In our description above we simply 
assumed that large investors, top managers, as well as executives from publicly known NGOs 
would typically be in dominant positions to determine the legitimacy of different pro-social 
practices. Yet, the particular distribution of power is obviously an empirical question. The 
formal positions might not necessarily correlate to the actual distribution of power.  
(3) Identification of dominant actors’ dispositions. As we explained above, whether the 
individuals in dominant positions use their power to support or enact pro-social practices 
depends on their habitus and, thus, on their dispositions. Hence, the identification of actors’ 
dispositions – their cognitive frames and preferences – is the third crucial point for 
understanding whether and in what way an engagement in pro-social practices takes place. 
The identification of dispositions moreover enables the researcher to explain changes in the 
valuations of pro-social behavior. As we have seen before, such change might either be 
triggered by changes in the dominant agents’ habitus or by a mismatch of the dominant agents’ 
habitus enabling new actors to step and evoking new evaluations of pro-social practices. Here 
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too, the identification of the dominant actors’ habitus and potential changes in them remain 
empirical questions. Thus, researchers interested in the legitimacy of particular pro-social 
practices or potential changes in their legitimacy will have to examine the dominant actors’ 
dispositions and their potential changes or mismatches (c.f., Baxter and Chua, 2008). One 
way to examine this could involve an examination of the relevant actors’ socialization in other 
fields, such as participation in particular educational programs or engagement in specific 
political groups. 
 
Future research extending the Bourdieusian approach to CSR 
In this paper we have provided an outline of the Bourdieusian approach to CSR by explaining 
the key mechanisms driving pro-social behavior. In this way we have tried to reveal the kinds 
of insight that can be gained from such an approach. Yet, in order to unleash its full potential, 
further research into different elements of the theoretical approach is needed. In the following 
we want to highlight three areas in particular: (1) exploration of the relations between 
different fields, (2) exploration of pluralism and divergence in organizational fields and (3) 
exploration of the relations between different (pro-social and other) practices. 
First, in our description of the Bourdieusian approach to CSR we have focused 
particularly on the structures and dynamics within an individual field. The field was thereby 
portrayed as largely autonomous; i.e. as a relatively independent universe, exhibiting its own 
highly unique stakes and distinctive dynamics. Yet, as Bourdieu (1990) stressed himself, 
different fields might possess different degrees of autonomy. Some fields might be self-
determined while others are significantly influenced by adjacent fields. Exploring the 
potential influences across field boundaries might provide additional insights into the 
mechanisms through which attitudes towards pro-social practices might change. This would 
allow us to capture the effects that, for example, social movements (Crossley, 2003) or 
political maneuvers (Bourdieu, 1998) in adjacent fields might have on the pro-social behavior 
in the organizational field in question. Examples of key questions in this line of inquiry are: 
How do changes in adjacent fields influence the power structures in the organizational field in 
question and how does this change the conditions under which actors within the 
organizational field undertake pro-social initiatives? Which factors determine whether and to 
what extent external changes affect the organizational field? 
Second, our description of the Bourdieusian approach to CSR was based on the 
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assumption that dominant actors share the same habitus and that all practices within a 
particular field are subject to the same illusio. Thus, we portrayed the organizational field as 
characterized by one mode of evaluating pro-social behaviors. However, in the era of 
globalization and with the prevalence of multinational corporations operating in pluralistic 
contexts (Scott, 1982), the assumption of a single and consistent illusio guiding actors’ 
evaluations of pro-social practices becomes somewhat problematic. Hence, future research 
needs to explore ways to conceptualize the potential co-existence of several illusions within 
the same field, according to which pro-social practices might be evaluated differently; that is, 
where some dominant actors might consider particular pro-social practices as legitimate while 
others do not. Examples of key questions in this line of inquiry are: How can we 
conceptualize the co-existence of different illusions within the same field? How do different 
illusions relate to each other and how do they affect the structures of power? How do multiple 
illusions affect the legitimacy and alterations of different pro-social practices? How does the 
co-existence of different illusions affect the likelihood for the adoption of false as compared 
to accurate representations of pro-social practices?  
Third, a further area of exploration concerns the way in which different (pro-social and 
other) practices relate to each other. As is fairly self-evident, practices are typically not 
enacted in isolation but in relation to other practices. Exploring potential relations between 
practices might provide important additional insights into the likelihood of the adoption of 
particular pro-social practices. In a very crude way, we might distinguish between neutral, 
complementary and conflicting relations between practices. As a case in point for conflicting 
practices we might think about practices that enhance the transparency of the organization as 
a means of fighting corruption and practices that are aimed at defending the personal privacy 
of individual members of the corporation. Another example of adversarial relations between 
practices might be the way that auditing and inspection practices might undermine the 
engagements of corporations in false representation practices. In turn, different practices may 
be complementary, like ISO Standards for CSR. As the requirements for certification 
typically build upon each other, the existence of one standard makes it easier to adopt the 
other one as well. Accordingly, several studies showed that organizations with ISO 9000 
standards were more likely do adopt also the ISO 14000 standard (e.g., Corbett and Kirsch, 
2001; Vastag, 2004). Examples for key questions in this line of inquiry are: What relations 
between different practices can we distinguish? How is the relation between practices affected 
by the illusio? How does the relation between practices affect the likelihood for the adoption 
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of particular pro-social practices? How does the relation between practices affect the extent to 
which organizations adopt false representations of their pro-social engagements? 
 
CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTION 
We started this article with the question ‘Why do corporate actors engage in pro-social 
behavior?’, suggesting that Bourdieu’s theory of social practice lends itself particularly well 
to explore this issue. Outlining the Bourdieusian approach we directed the attention to two 
main themes. First, within the Bourdieusian approach an engagement in pro-social behavior 
can be conceptualized as a transformation of economic capital into other forms of capital. 
Whether this transformation is likely to occur depends on which forms of capital are of value 
in the respective field. Thus, the value of capital rests on its social recognition by dominant 
actors, i.e. the illusio of the field. As Bourdieu conceptualizes social life as an ongoing 
struggle for power, an engagement in pro-social behavior may function as a weapon, or stake 
if it increases the corporate members’ symbolic capital. The Bourdieusian perspective 
emphasizes the crucial role of dominant actors like CEOs, large investors and others, as they 
ultimately define which capital is of value in the organizational field. Their habitus is a key in 
understanding managers’ pro-social engagements: If dominant actors deem pro-social 
behavior legitimate, managers will engage in such practices when they conceive an 
engagement as promising for having positive effects on their position in the field. Changes of 
pro-social behavior may be explained by changes in the dispositions of the dominant actors as 
well as by changes of dominant actors. Thus, a Bourdieusian explanation of CSR 
engagements must take a wide range of factors into account: An engagement is likely to occur 
if it allows for a positive impact on a corporate member’s position, reflecting the specific 
situation at hand, his or her actual position in the organizational field, the illusio, and his or 
her habitus.  
 Second, in order to grasp the link between broader societal structures and the habitually 
shaped understandings the Bourdieusian approach theorizes pro-social behavior as a form of 
practice. In this sense, pro-social behavior is neither deterministically manipulated by its 
organizational context, nor is it free and autonomous, but rather an artful interpretation of the 
context. Actors’ pro-social practices follow a practical logic, i.e., actors improvise their way 
through a world that remains in a constant state of flux, in which their behavior and external 
environment are jointly and simultaneously co-created (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). Hence, pro-
33/49 
social behavior cannot adequately be understood by solely focusing on one level of analysis, 
conceptualizing, for example, individuals as rational managers serving the interest of the 
shareholder or, conversely, by ignoring the economic motivation behind social action.  
 By outlining and discussing the Bourdieusian approach to CSR we contribute to the 
literature in at least two ways: First of all, this study constitutes the first attempt to mobilize 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice in the context of CSR. Although many scholars have proposed 
to use the work of Bourdieu to analyze social action (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Lounsbury, 
2008; Lounsbury and Ventresca, 2003; Oakes et al., 1998; Özbilgin and Tatli, 2005), there is, 
as yet, no systematic, conceptual framework that draws on a Bourdieusian perspective to 
explain pro-social behavior. Thus, the study contributes to the CSR literature by advancing a 
practice perspective on CSR (Clegg et al., 2007), offering a broad base for a positive 
grounding of normative theories. Second, the development of our Bourdieusian approach is in 
line with recent calls for a multilayer approach to CSR (Heugens and Scherer, 2010; Orlitzky 
et al., 2011). That is, analyzing corporate engagements in CSR cannot be adequately 
accounted for by focusing exclusively on the micro or the macro level. Although some 
scholars have recently started to address this problem, they have either failed to address all 
relevant levels or struggled to theorize the relations between them (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; 
Waldman et al., 2006). Using Bourdieu’s theory as a conceptual framework inevitably directs 
the attention to the interplay between individual actors and organizational fields in explaining 
pro-social behavior. As Whittington (2011: 185) recently pointed out, “practice–theoretic 
research can never be purely ‘micro’ or ‘macro’; the other is always present”.  
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